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TOP RESPONSIVENESS AND NASH STABILITY
IN COALITION FORMATION GAMES
Dinko Dimitrov and Shao Chin Sung
Top responsiveness was shown by Alcalde and Revilla [1] to guarantee the existence of
core stable partitions in hedonic coalition formation games. In this paper we prove the
existence of Nash stable partitions under top responsiveness when a mutuality condition is
imposed.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In a hedonic coalition formation game each player’s preferences over coalitions de-
pend solely on the composition of members of her coalition (cf. Drèze and Greenberg
[5]). Given a hedonic game, one is usually interested in conditions that guarantee the
existence of stable outcomes (partitions of the set of players). For instance, Banerjee
et al. [2] focus on the existence of core stable partitions, while Bogomolnaia and
Jackson [3] present sufficient conditions for the existence of Nash stable partitions
as well.
Top responsiveness is introduced by Alcalde and Revilla [1] as a condition on
players’ preferences, which captures the idea of how each player believes that others
could complement her in the formation of research teams. As shown by the authors,
this condition suffices for the existence of core stable partitions in hedonic games.
This result is provided constructively, i. e., an algorithm, called the top covering
algorithm, is proposed for generating a core stable partition. A simplified version
of the top covering algorithm, which always returns the same outcome as the top
covering algorithm, is proposed by Dimitrov and Sung [4] (a preliminary version of
this paper). We have shown in that paper that the top responsiveness condition
guarantees the existence of strictly core stable partitions in hedonic games.
In this paper we elaborate on the question whether the top responsiveness condi-
tion guarantees the existence of Nash stable partitions in hedonic games. We provide
an example to illustrate that Nash stable partitions may fail to exist, and prove that
imposing a mutuality condition turns out to be sufficient for the existence.
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2. SETUP
2.1. Hedonic games
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a finite set of players. Each nonempty subset of N is called
a coalition. Each player i is endowed with preferences ºi over the set Ai = {X ⊆
N | i ∈ X} of all possible coalitions she may belong to, i. e., each ºi is a complete
pre-ordering over Ai. A hedonic game is described by a pair 〈N,º〉, where º is a
profile of players’ preferences, i. e., º= (º1,º2, . . . ,ºn). An outcome Π for 〈N,º〉
is a partition of the player set N , i. e., Π is a collection of nonempty pairwise disjoint
coalitions whose union is N . For each partition Π of N and for each player i ∈ N ,
we denote by Π(i) the coalition in Π containing i.
Given a hedonic game 〈N,º〉 and a partition Π of N , the notion of core stability
is based on the absence of coalitional deviations in which every player is strictly
better off in comparison to his corresponding coalition in the partition Π. On the
other hand, Π is said to be strictly core stable if there is no coalitional deviations in
which every player is weakly better off and at least one player is strictly better off
in comparison to his corresponding coalition in the partition Π. Moreover, Π is said
to be Nash stable if there is no player who would like to leave his current coalition
in Π and stay either single or join another coalition in Π. In the formal definitions
given below these three stability notions are defined in a “positive” way that will be
very useful when providing our existence proof.
• A partition Π is core stable in the game 〈N,º〉 if, for each nonempty X ⊆ N ,
– Π(i) ºi X for some i ∈ X;
• A partition Π is strictly core stable in the game 〈N,º〉 if, for each nonempty
X ⊆ N ,
– Π(i) Âi X for some i ∈ X, or
– Π(i) ºi X for every i ∈ X;
• A partition Π is Nash stable in the game 〈N,º〉 if, for each X ∈ Π ∪ {∅} and
for each i ∈ N ,
– Π(i) ºi X ∪ {i}.
Observe that strict core stability implies core stability. On the other hand, there
are no implications between Nash stability and the other two stability notions: nei-
ther core stability or strict core stability implies Nash stability, nor Nash stability
implies core stability or strict core stability.
2.2. Choice sets and top responsiveness
Let i ∈ N and X ∈ Ai. We denote by Ch(i,X) ⊆ 2X ∩ Ai the set of maximals of i
on X under ºi, i. e.,
Ch(i,X) = {Y ∈ 2X ∩ Ai | Y ºi Z for each Z ∈ 2X ∩ Ai}.
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Observe that each Y ∈ Ch(i,X) satisfies i ∈ Y ⊆ X. Moreover, for each Y, Z ⊆
2X ∩ Ai, we have Y Âi Z if Y ∈ Ch(i,X) and Z 6∈ Ch(i,X).
As in the work of Alcalde and Revilla [1], we assume that players’ preferences
satisfy top responsiveness, i. e., we assume that, for each i ∈ N , the following three
conditions are satisfied:
Condition 1: For each X ∈ Ai, |Ch(i,X)| = 1.
By ch(i,X) we denote the unique maximal set of player i on X under ºi, i. e.,
Ch(i,X) = {ch(i,X)}. Then,
Condition 2: For each pair X,Y ∈ Ai, X Âi Y if ch(i,X) Âi ch(i, Y );
Condition 3: For each pair X,Y ∈ Ai, X Âi Y if ch(i,X) = ch(i, Y ) and X ⊂ Y .
As shown by Alcalde and Revilla [1] and Dimitrov and Sung [4], the top re-
sponsiveness condition suffices for the existence of strictly core stable partitions in
hedonic games.
2.3. The simplified top covering algorithm
Here we present the algorithm proposed by Dimitrov and Sung [4]. The algorithm is
a simplified version of the top covering algorithm introduced by Alcalde and Revilla
[1]. It can be seen as a generalization of Gale’s top trading cycle (see Shapley and
Scarf [6] for more details).
Let t be a positive integer. We define a function Ct : N × 2N → 2N as follows.
For each i ∈ N and for each X ∈ Ai,
• C1(i,X) = ch(i,X), and
• Ct+1(i,X) = ⋃j∈Ct(i,X) ch(j,X) for each positive integer t.
Let i ∈ N and X ∈ Ai. Observe that j ∈ ch(j,X) ⊆ X if j ∈ X (i. e., X ∈ Aj),
and thus, i ∈ C1(i,X) ⊆ X. Let t be a positive integer, and suppose Ct(i,X) ⊆
X. Then, j ∈ ch(j,X) ⊆ X for each j ∈ Ct(i,X), and by definition, Ct(i,X) ⊆
Ct+1(i,X) ⊆ X. It follows that C|N |+1(i,X) = C|N |(i,X). By CC(i,X) we denote
C|N |(i,X).
Now we are ready to describe the simplified top covering algorithm.
Simplified top covering algorithm:
Given: A hedonic game 〈N,º〉 satisfying top responsiveness.
Step 1: Set R1 := N and Π1 := ∅.
Step 2: For k := 1 to |N |:
Step 2.1: Select an i ∈ Rk satisfying |CC(i, Rk)| ≤ |CC(j, Rk)| for each j ∈ Rk.
Step 2.2: Set Sk := CC(i, Rk), Πk := Πk−1 ∪ {Sk}, and Rk+1 := Rk \ Sk.
456 D. DIMITROV AND S. C. SUNG
Step 2.3: If Rk+1 = ∅, then goto Step 3.
Step 3: Return Πk as outcome.
We denote by ΠTC〈N,º〉 the outcome obtained by applying the simplified top cov-
ering algorithm to 〈N,º〉. The following proposition is shown by Dimitrov and
Sung [4].
Proposition 1. Let 〈N,º〉 be a hedonic game satisfying top responsiveness. When
applied to 〈N,º〉, the simplified top covering algorithm ends in finite steps and its
outcome ΠTC〈N,º〉 is a partition of N . Moreover, Π
TC
〈N,º〉 is strictly core stable in
〈N,º〉.
By K we denote the number of the repetitions of Step 2. Then, according to the
algorithm, we have
• ∅ = RK+1 ⊂ RK ⊂ · · · ⊂ R1 = N ,
• Sk ⊆ Rk for each 1 ≤ k ≤ K, and
• ΠTC〈N,º〉 = {S1, S2, . . . , SK}.
In order to analyze the partition ΠTC〈N,º〉, for each i ∈ N , we denote by k(i)
the number such that i ∈ Sk(i). In other words, the coalition ΠTC〈N,º〉(i) = Sk(i) is
included into ΠTC〈N,º〉 at the k(i)th iteration of Step 2. Since Π
TC
〈N,º〉 is a partition of
N , the number k(i) is well-defined for each i ∈ N . The following proposition is also
shown by Dimitrov and Sung [4].
Proposition 2. Let 〈N,º〉 be a hedonic game satisfying top responsiveness. Then,
ΠTC〈N,º〉(i) = CC(i, Rk(i)) for each i ∈ N .
Now let us summarize the properties of ΠTC〈N,º〉(i) according to Proposition 2 and
the definition of CC(·, ·). Since ch(i, Rk(i)) = C1(i, Rk(i)) ⊆ CC(i, Rk(i)), we have
ch(i, Rk(i)) = ch(i,ΠTC〈N,º〉(i)) ⊆ ΠTC〈N,º〉(i). (1)
As a special case, when ch(i, Rk(i)) = ch(i,ΠTC〈N,º〉(i)) = {i}, we have
{i} = ch(i, Rk(i)) = C1(i, Rk(i)) = · · · = C|N |(i, Rk(i)) = CC(i, Rk(i)).
Hence,
ΠTC〈N,º〉(i) = {i} when ch(i,ΠTC〈N,º〉(i)) = {i}. (2)
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3. INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY
In order to show our main result, here we show that the outcome ΠTC〈N,º〉 of the
simplified top covering algorithm is individually rational, where a partition Π is
individually rational in the game 〈N,º〉 if Π(i) ºi {i} for each i ∈ N .
Observe that (strict) core stability implies individual rationality, and a proof of
the core stability of ΠTC〈N,º〉 can be found in the work of Alcalde and Revilla [1] (or
in the work of Dimitrov and Sung [4]). Here, a short proof of individual rationality
is provided.
Theorem 1. Let 〈N,º〉 be a hedonic game satisfying top responsiveness. Then,
ΠTC〈N,º〉 is individually rational for 〈N,º〉.
P r o o f . Let i ∈ N . Then, we have ch(i,ΠTC〈N,º〉(i)) ºi ch(i, {i}) = {i} from
i ∈ ΠTC〈N,º〉(i).
• When ch(i,ΠTC〈N,º〉(i)) 6= {i}, we have ch(i,ΠTC〈N,º〉(i)) Âi ch(i, {i}) from Con-
dition 1. Then, from Condition 2, we have ΠTC〈N,º〉(i) Âi {i}.
• When ch(i,ΠTC〈N,º〉(i)) = {i}, we have ΠTC〈N,º〉(i) = {i} from (2), and hence, we
have ΠTC〈N,º〉(i) ∼i {i}.
Therefore, ΠTC〈N,º〉(i) ºi {i} for each i ∈ N , i. e., ΠTC〈N,º〉 is individually rational
for 〈N,º〉. ¤
4. NASH STABILITY
Nash stability is the strongest stability notion that is based on (the absence of)
individual deviations since in its definition neither the reaction of the welcoming
coalition nor the reaction of the coalition a player leaves is taken into account.
Unfortunately, top responsiveness does not guarantee the existence of a Nash stable
partition as exemplified next.
Example 1. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and players’ preferences be as follows:
{1} Â1 {1, 2} ∼1 {1, 3} Â1 {1, 2, 3},
{2} Â2 {1, 2} ∼2 {2, 3} Â2 {1, 2, 3},
{1, 2, 3} Â3 {1, 3} ∼3 {2, 3} Â3 {3} .
The reader can easily check that this game satisfies top responsiveness. Notice that
any partition in which player 1 and player 2 are not single will be blocked by the cor-
responding player. Hence, we have to check only the partition Π = {{1}, {2}, {3}}.
However, {1, 3} Â3 {3} (and {2, 3} Â3 {3}). Therefore, a Nash stable partition does
not exist for this game.
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In order to guarantee the existence of a Nash stable partition for a hedonic game
〈N,º〉 we will require, in addition to top responsiveness, 〈N,º〉 to satisfy mutuality,
i. e., the following condition:
• For each i, j ∈ N and for each X ∈ Ai ∩ Aj , i ∈ ch(j,X) if and only if
j ∈ ch(i,X).
In other words, mutuality requires that, for any group X of players, the members
of every player’s maximal on X mutually complement each other. In the formula-
tion of this condition we were inspired by the existence result in the seminal paper
of Bogomolnaia and Jackson [3]. These authors show that the combination of ad-
ditive separability and symmetry (a stronger version of mutuality) guarantees the
existence of Nash stable partitions. Here, we show that, by imposing both top re-
sponsiveness and mutuality, the simplified top covering algorithm generates a Nash
stable partition. Note that one can easily construct a hedonic game in which players’
preferences satisfy top responsiveness but are not additive separable.
We would like to mention finally a common feature between the setup in which
additive separability and symmetry (mutuality) are imposed together and the setup
in which top responsiveness and mutuality are imposed together: both additive
separability and top responsiveness are conditions on individual’s preference itself,
while mutuality (and hence, symmetry) is a condition on a preference profile.
Theorem 2. Let 〈N,º〉 be a hedonic game satisfying top responsiveness and
mutuality. Then, ΠTC〈N,º〉 is Nash stable for 〈N,º〉.
P r o o f . According to Theorem 1, ΠTC〈N,º〉 is individually rational, i. e.,
ΠTC〈N,º〉(i) ºi {i} for each i ∈ N .
Hence, in order to show that ΠTC〈N,º〉 is Nash stable, it suffices to show that
ΠTC〈N,º〉(i) ºi X ∪ {i} for each i ∈ N and for each X ∈ ΠTC〈N,º〉.
Let i ∈ N and X ∈ ΠTC〈N,º〉. Observe that X is nonempty. Moreover, let k be the
number such that X = Sk, i. e., X is included in ΠTC〈N,º〉 at the kth iteration of
Step 2 in the simplified top covering algorithm.
• Suppose k = k(i). Then, we have X = Sk = Sk(i) = ΠTC〈N,º〉(i), and thus, i ∈
X. It follows that X ∪ {i} = X = ΠTC〈N,º〉(i), and hence, ΠTC〈N,º〉(i) ∼i X ∪ {i}.
• Suppose k > k(i). Then, we have X ⊆ Rk ⊂ Rk(i), and from i ∈ Rk(i), we
have X ∪ {i} ⊆ Rk(i). Hence
ch(i,ΠTC〈N,º〉(i)) = ch(i, R
k(i)) ºi ch(i,X ∪ {i}).
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Observe from Condition 1 that
– ch(i,ΠTC〈N,º〉(i)) 6= ch(i,X∪{i}) implies ch(i,ΠTC〈N,º〉(i)) Âi ch(i,X∪{i}),
and thus, ΠTC〈N,º〉(i) Âi X ∪ {i} from Condition 2.
When ch(i,ΠTC〈N,º〉(i)) = ch(i,X ∪ {i}), we have
ch(i,ΠTC〈N,º〉(i)) = ch(i,X ∪ {i}) = {i},
because X ∩ΠTC〈N,º〉(i) = ∅, and thus,
i ∈ ch(i,ΠTC〈N,º〉(i)) = ch(i,X ∪ {i}) ⊆ ΠTC〈N,º〉(i) ∩ (X ∩ {i}) = {i}.
Then, from (2), we have ΠTC〈N,º〉(i) = {i}, and moreover, from X 6= ∅ and
Condition 3, we have ΠTC〈N,º〉(i) = {i} Âi X ∪ {i}.
• Suppose k < k(i). Then, we have i ∈ Rk \X. From (1), we have ch(j,X) =
ch(j, Rk) for each j ∈ X, and thus,
i 6∈ ch(j,X) = ch(j,X ∪ {i}) for each j ∈ X.
By mutuality, we have j 6∈ ch(i,X ∪ {i}) for each j ∈ X, which implies
{i} = ch(i,X ∪ {i}) ºi X ∪ {i}. Since ΠTC〈N,º〉 is individually rational, we
have ΠTC〈N,º〉(i) ºi {i} ºi X ∪ {i}. ¤
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